age of 26, he was made Attorney-General to the Parlement of Paris, which at the time had both judicial and legislative powers. However, in 1789 de Séchelles was disinherited because of his early and passionate involvement with the revolution. (In pre-revolutionary France, under the system of primogeniture, which governed the law of succession for the nobility, the eldest son inherited the entire estate, to the exclusion of younger siblings. Amongst the peasants and the middle class, on the other hand, a father had an absolute right to choose his heir (not necessarily the eldest son), and leave very little to the other children. During the period of the French Revolution, in 1792, de Séchelles was elected to the legislative assembly and then the National Convention. He was deeply involved in drafting the decree of 7 March 1793, by which the National Convention abolished 'the power to make gratuitous transfers to direct descendants, whether mortis causa, inter vivos, or by contractual gift', thus giving all descendants 'an equal right in the division of the property of their ascendants'. 2 In 1800, after the French Revolution, laws prohibiting parents from giving or willing gifts to their children, and their effects, were retracted or substantially amended under the Directory. However, Hyland notes that the revolutionary provisions serve as an excellent illustration of the Western law's distrust of gift-giving, a distrust that has its sources in the Roman Law (lex Cincia of 204 BCE).
Moreover, by Decree of 17 Nivôse, all gifts which had the effect of prejudicing the presumptive heirs were made invalid with retroactive operation to July 1789. And then, two months later, all inter vivos gifts were retroactively voided to 1789. These laws, though made in the name of equality, had a collateral effect of restoring Hérault de Séchelles' inheritance. Hérault did not live to enjoy his fortune, however, for, on 5 April 1794, accused of treason, he was tried before the Revolutionary Tribunal, condemned, and guillotined. The distrust of gift-giving became: 4 Hyland argues that the distrust is unfounded and supplies his own vision of what the law of gifts, particularly, inter vivos gifts, should be. Chapter 1 involves the reader in a wide-ranging and insightful discussion on the nature, custom, and communal and political status of gift-offering and gift-receiving.
In Chapter 2 he sets out the methodology of comparative law, and explains how it guides his analysis.
Chapter 3, 'The Legal Concept of the Gift', forms the centerpiece of the book insofar as the following four Chapters ('Gift Capacity'; 'The Gift Promise'; 'Making the Gift' and 'Revocation') are devoted to detailed comparative descriptions of the ways in which different jurisdictions approach and define the requirements for valid gift disposition. In the final chapter, 'The Place of the Gift' Hyland discusses the question of whether the institution of giftgiving should be characterised as contract (as in, for example, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and other civilian countries), an aspect of property law (as in the common law countries), or an autonomous legal institution with its own, uniquely matched, norms.
When analysing the legal concept of the gift, Hyland notes that 'a systematic [legal] definition of gift is hard to find' 5 1. 'gratuitousness' (no expectation of consideration); because, rather than defining the legal constituents of the gift, the law tends to focus on the process of gift-givingthe requirements for its valid execution or disposition. He adopts four definitional elements of the gift: 2. 'the subjective element' (whether the donor had a subjective intent to donate, either by donative intent or by an agreement between the parties that the transaction will be gratuitous);
3. 'an inter vivos transfer' (a transfer that takes place during the donor's lifetime, by contrast with a testamentary disposition); and 4. 'the gift object' (at common law, any alienable real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal property, as well as assignable choses in action can be subjects of gift; in civilian jurisdictions the gift object tends to include such patrimonial rights as 'ownership rights (droits réels) of both movable and immovable property').
6
Any lawyer from a common law system would raise an eyebrow at the absence of a serious discussion relating to the requirements of (1) the donor having to be of sound mind; and (2) the donor's intention to donate being voluntary, and free of coercion.
7
Siebert's approach still governs German law, and has been very influential in other civil law systems. Of the civilian countries discussed by Hyland, only Argentina actually specifies in addition that a gift transfer must be voluntary.
However, these requirements were not among the elements of the gift as initially articulated by the German jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861). Likewise, they are conspicuously missing from the legal definition articulated by Wolfgang Siebert, who elaborated Savigny's ideas. Hyland adopts Siebert's description of three principal requirements that make inter vivos gifts valid, namely: (1) 'disposition (Zuwendung) that both enriches the donee's patrimony and impoverishes that of the donor'; (2) the gratuitous (unentgeltlich) nature of the disposition, and (3) the acceptance by the donee of 'the disposition and its gratuitous character'. Richard Hyland briefly refers to freedom of compulsion in the context of the Roman understanding of generosity, and cites Italian jurists who argue that 'any sort of compulsion, whether physical or moral', and any 'transaction designed to satisfy a preexisting moral or social duty is compelled' 9 and cannot coexist with gratuitousness. However, he considers that this 'approach operates with a conception of freedom that cannot be reconciled with the conventional experience of gift'.
10
It is a great pity that Hyland does not place the formulation by Siebert of the legal elements of a gift in its historical context. For Wolfgang Siebert (1905 Siebert ( -1959 Well, this depends on one's view about whether the law of gifts should include protection of vulnerable donors from donees who are in the position of power in the relationship.
11 was a Nazi Party 12 7 For example, undue influence is mentioned in relation to guardian and ward; physicianpatient; priest-penitent, and lawyer-client relationships (Chapter 6 ('Making the Gift')) but not in relation to donees and donors. Hyland argues that there is no need to have general laws safeguarding donors against undue influence because the law already does so for donors who are in guardian-ward, physician-patient, priest-penitent, and lawyer-client relationships (Chapter 6 ('Making the Gift')).
member from at least 1933, and one of the legal theorists of National Socialism. 13 He was active in re-casting private law in the light of the Nazi Party policies. For example, on 12 and 13 October 1935, at a conference of the University Teachers' Section of the Federation of National Socialist German Lawyers, 14 Siebert voted in favour of a resolution against legal equality. It called for the replacement of the legal terms 'human' and 'natural person' within the meaning of article 1 of the German Civil Code (BGB) with racially defined concepts. According to the resolution, these two terms 'obscured and falsified the differences that existed between members of the German Volk, citizens of the German Reich, Jews and so forth'. 15 A new type of partisan whose Party loyalty cannot be questioned now fills the judicial positions. This was made possible in part by the systematic purging of "non-Aryans" and of those who showed evidences of lack of conformity. The judiciary, in the language of National Socialists, was "gradually purified."
20
The bailiwick of the Nazi Labour Courts included some 12 million slave labourers in the labour camps for 'unreliable elements' (unzuverlässige Elemente), and in the extermination camps. The Tribunal thus described 'the national pattern or plan for racial extermination' in which, both Siebert and Schlegelberger were implicated:
Fundamentally, the program was one for the actual extermination of Jews and Poles, either by means of killing or by confinement in concentration camps, which merely made death slower and more painful. But lesser forms of racial persecution were universally practiced by governmental authority and constituted an integral part in the general policy of the Reich. We have already noted the decree by which Jews were excluded from the legal profession. Intermarriage between Jews and persons of German blood was prohibited. Sexual intercourse between Jews and German nationals was punished with extreme severity by the courts. By other decrees Jews were almost completely expelled from public service, from educational institutions, and from many business enterprises. Upon the death of a Jew his property was confiscated. Under the provisions for confiscation under the 11 th amendment to the German Citizenship Law … the decision as to confiscation of the property of living Jews was left to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. The law against Poles and Jews … (4 December 1941), was rigorously enforced. 25 It is against this historical background that one would have expected the author to examine whether Siebert and his editor, Schlegelberger, had any reasons for excluding voluntariness and freedom from coercion from the requirements for legally valid gifts. Richard Hyland has adopted Siebert's principles as the centrepiece of his book. The question arises of why, given the date of their publication, their author and editor, he did not repeat the pattern of historical, political and economic analysis so aptly used in the case of Marie-Jean Hérault de Séchelles. Whatever the answer is, the failure to consider these factors detracts from the persuasive force of the subsequent arguments.
Hyland concludes his massive study with an idealistic 'new vision' and a prediction that: (1) the 'outmoded' legal regimes, which at present regulate 24 gift-giving, will reduce their protections of donors, including the protection afforded by the requirement of gift-making capacity, not only in terms of sound mind, but also voluntariness; 26 (2) forms will be created to simplify the rules by which gift promises are made; and at common law 'exceptions to the consideration doctrine will reach beyond detrimental reliance to permit the enforcement of all gift promises that are sincerely meant'; (3) the courts will enforce seriously intended promises, even where they lack the required formality.
27
According to Hyland:
Indeed, except in specific circumstances, for example safe harbour provisions and transfers of real estate, formalities will no longer remain a precondition to a valid execution of a gift.
The legal recognition of a valid gift will henceforth depend on a finding of clear donative intent. There are two aspects of this intent. The donor must have intended, first, that the transfer was to be gratuitous, and, second, that the transfer was to operate immediately. A gift completed in the prescribed forms will satisfy this proof. Satisfying the traditional delivery requirement will also offer relevant evidence. If the forms have not been employed, the courts will evaluate all of the facts and the circumstances. The role of the courts will be to determine whether a gift was actually intended and made. 28 Hyland also envisages that The law will no longer intervene to revoke executed gifts. Some argue that the institution is already in decline ... Tort law provides remedies for most civil wrongs. Revocation due to the birth of a child has been so roundly criticized that the latest French code revision greatly restricted it. Revocation for impoverishment will be unnecessary as social services become more widely available. The goal will instead be to guarantee the legal security of executed gifts.
29
There are two fundamental problems with Hyland's vision of the new law of gifts. The first again concerns the absence of the requirement of voluntariness and freedom from coercion. Intention is not the same as voluntariness. 30 26 According to Hyland, above n 2, 594, 'Capacity rules will be simplified to coincide with the capacity rules for other legal acts'.
In 27 Hyland posits that, since 'the courts in most systems now base their decisions on all of the facts and circumstances of the case … [they] should be permitted to do so explicitly': ibid 593. 28 Ibid 594. 29 Ibid. 30 Hyland admits that 'Donative intent has proved especially difficult to define', and notes that 'a finding of donative intent may often depend on whether it is possible to create a convincing Germany during the 1930s, Jewish owners of businesses, 31 shops, manufacturing plants, apartments, bicycles, or a packet of cigarettes were often faced with a choice between beating, arrest or extermination on the one hand, and 'gifting' their goods, property and choses in action to individual Aryans or to the Reich officials on the other. 32 Irwin Cotler 33 has described the system of 'the Aryanization or confiscation of Jewish property without compensation and its transfer to Aryan hands (ie, Nazi loyalists) on pain of imprisonment for refusal', 34 which operated from 1938 35 in Austria (where the archival material is most extensive). fair weather. And unfortunately, although conditions for Jews and other nonAryans under the Third Reich were extreme, there have always been, are, and will be corrupt regimes and private circumstances under or in which vulnerable donors with ostensibly donative intentions in fact execute their 'gifts' under pressure. This is why, at least since the Roman lex Cincia, the law has inserted procedural safeguards aimed at protecting the vulnerable.
The second problem with Hyland's vision or proposal involves the principle of the coherence of the law. If executed gifts carried a guarantee of legal security, then, by definition, the law of Torts (or any other law) would be powerless to intervene. Such guarantee would have the effect of subverting 'many other principles of law, and statutory provisions, which strike a balance of rights and obligations, duties and freedoms'.
37
To sum up, the book is a very impressive work of great scholarship -albeit one espousing debatable views -which, to borrow from its author's concluding comments, 38 provides the reader with 'an intricate and instructive tapestry of comparative law' relating to gifts. 
